This article reports that some robustness of the notions of predicativity and of autonomous progression is broken down if as the given infinite total entity we choose some mathematical entities other than the traditional ω. Namely, the equivalence between normal transfinite recursion scheme and new dependent transfinite recursion scheme, which does hold in the context of subsystems of second order number theory, does not hold in the contexts of subsystems of second order set theory where the universe V of sets is treated as the given totality (nor in the context of those of n+3-th order number or set theories, where the class of all n+2-th order objects is treated as the given totality).
Introduction
Predicativism is a mathematical standpoint which could be said to be between Platonism and Constructivism, and whose origin goes back to Poincaré and Russell. While natural numbers are accepted as a totality, other infinite entities are not and so-called "vicious circles", those definitions which depend on the totality of the class the defined sets belong to, are rejected. Thus, traditionally, ω is the only infinite entity whose totality is accepted. However, Feferman [3, p.617] stated that the predicativity is a relative notion, and we can consider other kinds of predicativity, relative to various structures. Among them, Feferman mentioned "predicativity given the notion of the cumulative hierarchy of sets" as an example. This seems to be an extreme case because the totality of it might contradict the standard view of open-endedness. We can however consider also predicativity given (the totality of) P(ω) (i.e., real numbers) and predicativity given P(P(ω)) (or equivalently, the class of all functions).
What kinds of mathematical discussion can be justified from these predicative standpoints? There have been so many arguments for the traditional one:
(A) Feferman [3, p .605] took as the limit of predicativity (in the traditional sense) the closure under autonomous progression of ramified hierarchy, each level R α of which consists of all those sets (of natural numbers) definable by quantifiers over lower levels (in modern terms, R α+1 = P(ω) ∩ Def(R α )). Thus the class of all sets of natural numbers is not given as a totality, but always being generated. Since all the (meaningful) formulae must be formalized in the ramified way, the quantifiers varying over whole the ramified hierarchy make no sense.
(B) Since the ramified hierarchy can be simulated by iterated elementary comprehension by the use of universal formula, and since the latter is defined in the former, autonomous progression of ramified hierarchy could be identified with the autonomous progression of iterated elementary comprehension:
since the totality of ω is accepted, number quantifiers make senses and so elementary comprehension should be accepted; once it is accepted, iterated application of it along a primitive recursive ordinal α should be accepted, provided a well-orderedness proof of α is accepted.
As the aforementioned constraint in (A), the schematic axiom (i.e., induction) for the formulae containing second order quantifiers not bound by levels of the ramified hierarchy should not a priori be accepted. Since those with such bounds are coded by first order quantifiers (for detail, see §5, especially before Definition 17), the schemata are restricted to elementary ones 1 .
(C) One can argue that the well-orders are not necessarily coded by primitive recursive relations, but can be any elementary formulae with free variables, provided that the well-orderedness is proved universally (see footnote 6 for detail).
(D) One can further argue that the rule "..., provided a well-orderedness proof is accepted" could be replaced by an implication "..., if it is a well-order". The resulting axiom should be called internalized autonomous progression of elementary comprehension, and, in literatures (e.g., [14] ), is called transfinite recursion.
We are not discussing which is right here. Whichever we choose, we can say:
if we have the well-orderedness of α 1 by means of iterated (elementary) comprehension along ω, and if we have the well-orderedness of α 2 by means of iterated comprehension along α 1 , ..., then the iterated comprehension along α n should be accepted, for standard n.
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However, the natural question arises: Even if we agree that predicativity should posses some of these closure properties, why is it sufficient? Is there another type of progression that should be accepted predicatively? Particularly, (E) Once having accepted (internalized) autonomous progression, should not we accept also autonomous progression of autonomous progression itself? Namely, If the well-orderedness of α and of β 0 has been accepted, and if, only by already accepted reasonings, we have a derivation, uniformly in ξ ∈ α, from iterated comprehension along η<ξ β η to the wellorderedness of β ξ , then that along ξ∈α β ξ should also be accepted.
(F) There seems to be no reason to stop at (E) "2-fold autonomous progression". We should also accept 3-fold one, 4-fold one, and so on.
(B')-(F') Or, "elementary" in (B)-(F) could be replaced by ∆ 1 e , (i.e., essentially ∆ 1 1 ), since it is "recognizable invariance" [3, p.606 ] during the generating process.
Nevertheless, the question which of (A)-(F) (or -(F')) is the right does not affect the limit of the fragment of mathematics justifiable from the traditional predicativity. For, we can prove the proof-theoretic equivalence (or equiconsistency) between the system associated with the apparently the strongest, namely the internalized version of (F'), and that with (A), if we employ plausible formulations as we will below (and, moreover, internalized versions of (D), (E), (F), (D'), (E') and (F') are all logically equivalent, not only proof-theoretically).
This is the robustness that we will show to break down in the contexts of the other kinds of predicativity listed at the beginning. It seems possible to claim that this robustness is a specialty of ω, and that, in the "normal" case, it should break down. We will see other specialties of ω, as bi-products of the proof.
More precisely, the contents of the present article are as follows. First, we are working in the frameworks of (a) second order set theory, whose language is L 2 S and of (b) n+2-th order number (and set) theory, whose language is L n+2 N (and L n+2 S ) for n ≥ 1. As base theories, in each framework we employ (a) Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory (or NBG for short), which contains:
-Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (with and without choice) with separation and replacement schemata applied to elementary L 2 S -formulae, -the comprehension schema for elementary L 2 S -formulae, for the requirement that the universe V of sets is a given totality; and, (b) so-called the Bernays-Gödel extension (or, sometimes, predicative extension) of full n+1-th order number (and set) theory, which contains:
-all the axioms of full n+1-th order number (or set) theory with all the schemata applied to any n+1-th order L n+2 -formulae,
-comprehension schema (yielding subclasses of the given totality, namely n+2-th order objects) for all n+1-th order L n+2 -formulae, for the requirement that n+1-th and lower order objects are all given.
Note that if we allow n = 0 then (b) includes both (a) and the framework of second order number theory with the base theory ACA 0 , as special cases.
In these frameworks, we define: the transfinite recursion scheme ∆ n+1 0 -TR, which allows iteration of ∆ n+1 0 -comprehension (i.e., elementary comprehension in (a); and n+1-th order comprehension in (b)) along any well-order whose domain is (included in) the given totality, as a formalization of "single-fold" internalized autonomous progression of the comprehension; and a dependent transfinite recursion scheme ∆ n+1 0 -TR as a formalization of the simplest nontrivial instance of multi-fold internalized autonomous progression; as well as those for ∆ -TR obviously implies the "external" counterpart, the separation between single-and multi-fold ones is now established for both internal and external versions.) We also see the underivability of ∆ 
The basis of this difference will also be discussed.
Thus the relations among the central notions in the traditional predicativity heavily depend on the specialty of ω. We could conclude that relative predicativity requires more studies than the trivial analogy to the traditional one.
Definitions of formal systems
Though we will obtain the results in both (a) second-order set theory, and (b) higher order number and set theories, we will work in one language with one base theory in the actual technicality. In this section, we give formal definitions of the languages L -CA 0 , explain the way to treat (a) and (b) uniformly, and, in §4, define in this way several axiom schemata, to be added to the base theory.
N of second order number theory) is two-sorted one, which contains the language of first order set theory (or first order number theory, respectively) as the fragment of the first sort, and which has a relation symbol ∈ between the two sorts.
(ii) For n ≥ 1, the languages L n+2 N and L n+2 S of n+2-th order number and set theories are n+2-sorted ones, which contain L 2 N and L 2 S , respectively, as the fragments of the first two sorts, and which has equalities = k for k+1-th order for k < n+1 and relation symbols ∈ k between k-th and k+1-th sorts for any k.
Equality is not primitive for the highest order, but is defined by extensionality.
Here k+1-th order objects are intended to represent sets of k-th order ones. We omit the subscripts 'N ' and 'S' when it is clear from the context or not important. When we need to know the orders of variables, we shall provide superscripts to variables. The superscript k in ∈ k is omitted when it is clear. In what follows, we assume n ≥ 0 and treat L n+2 N and L n+2 S uniformly, by the convention: upper-case Latin letters denote n+2-th order objects, and lower-case ones without superscripts denote those of the lower (i.e., ≤ n+1-th) orders.
n+2 -formula is said to be k+1-th order (or
, if it contains no k+2-th nor higher order quantifiers (but it may contain k+2-th and higher order parameters). An elementary formula is called ∆ 0 0 if it contains no unbounded quantifiers. Here we can find some conflict between the two counting systems: "n+1-th order" objects are also called "type n" objects. The term "n-th order number theory" and L n+2 are from the former, and Σ k j 's and x k are from the latter. Since both have been firmly standard, we have to get along with this conflict.
The most important feature of L n+2 is the ability to code pairs of lower order, by which we have the usual contraction rules on quantifiers. (ii) The k+2-th order (or type-k+1) pairing is defined (with Extensionality) by
(iii) For k+1-th order u and k-th order z, (u) z denotes {x k−1 | z, x k−1 ∈ u}. (iv) Similarly, for n+1-th order y, (X) y denotes the "class" {z n | y, z n ∈ X}.
Here "class" means a collection of those objects satisfying a fixed formula (or what is called an abstract). The use of this term might cause a confusion, since in the context of second order set theory, it also refers to "objects of second order". In the present article, however, we never make the use of the latter kind.
For formulae ϕ(X) and ψ(x), ϕ({x n | ψ(x)}) denotes the result of replacing all those subformulae of the form t ∈ X by ψ(t) in ϕ(X).
Definition 4. WF(W ) is defined as (∀Y )TI[Y ](W ), where
This expresses the well-foundedness of an n+2-th order relation W . This is a priori Π n+1 1
, and the question if it is equivalently ∆ n+1 0 will be crucial.
-theory, consisting of (0) Extensionality for lower order:
-formula ϕ free from u;
(3) the global well-order among n+1-th order objects:
(4) axioms for the first order part:
-the axioms of extensionality, empty set, pair, union, power set, infinity;
-formula ϕ free from z.
N and is Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory NBG in L 2 S , which are known to be conservative over Peano arithmetic PA and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice ZFC respectively. More generally, ∆ n+1 0 -CA 0 we have defined is what is known as the Bernays-Gödel extension of (so, conservative over) the full n+1-th order number or set theory.
The restriction in our base theory of all the schematic axioms to ∆ n+1 0 , i.e., the formulae without n+2-th order quantifiers can be explained as follows: Since we accepted the totality of the class of all n+1-th order objects, the formulae containing only n+1-th and lower order quantifiers are meaningful, whereas those containing n+2-th order ones are undermined, as discussed in (B) of §1. -formulae, and, with a new constant for the global well-order, Axiom (3) can also be.
Remark 8. By the canonical injection from k+1-th order part (k ≤ n) into n+1-th order part, defined as iterated singleton x → {x} n−k , we have global well-orders w k+1 = { x, y k | {x} n−k , {y} n−k n ∈ W } among the k+1-th order.
Global well-ordering and normal form theorem
It might seem strange that the higher order number and set theories contain Axiom (3). While the former has been investigated for a long time, it is unclear if the axiom is included in the standard formulation, since those of consistency strength above full second order number theory Z 2 (but below Z n for a fixed n) have not been considered so much (with few exceptions, e.g., Friedman's [5] famous result on determinacy, which deals with the higher order number theory in a variant of Gödel's constructible hierarchy). Though it could be claimed that the axiom is directly justified by our notion of "set of set of ... numbers", the author is not confident and, rather, would like to argue against it.
Remark 9. However, from the viewpoint of proof-theoretic (or consistency) strength, this does not matter: The author is preparing a work [13] which establishes the equiconsistency between ∆ n+1 0 -CA 0 (augmented by the additional axioms treated in the present article) with and without the axiom (3).
Moreover, for n = 0, we will not use (3): in L 2 N it is redundant because of the usual order < on ω, and in L 2 S the replacement scheme (or, more precisely, the reflection principle) can substitute (3) in our discussion, as shown in §7.
Our first essential use of this axiom is to prove normal form theorem:
to one in the following form, where f :
and where Q i 's are alternating (Q i ≡ ∃ if k−i is even, and Q i ≡ ∀ otherwise):
k+1-th order q.f.
Proof. By Remark 8, we have the axiom of choice for all orders except the highest: For k < n and for any ∆ n+1 0 -formula ϕ,
By this and dual, any ∆ n+1 0 -formula is equivalent to one in the form:
The well-orders also allow us to use the method of Skolem function on each order ≤ n+1. By generalizing the proof in second order number theory (see [14, Lemma V.1.4]), we have: For any k ≤ n and Σ k+1 1 -formula ϕ( x, X),
Definition 11. Let σ and π be universal Σ 0 1 -and Π 0 1 -formulae respectively.
where Q i 's are alternating and where υ ≡ π for odd k; υ ≡ σ otherwise.
Additional axiom schemata
Following the convention on the distinction of upper and lower cases, we can define several axiom schemata uniformly.
Definition 13. For a class Γ of formulae, define the following axiom schemata: 
The proof of (ii) below is literally the same, by the virtue of our abbreviations, as that in the second order case, e.g., in [6, Proposition 4.5] .
Proof. Since (i) and (iii) are trivial, we prove (ii) by working in ∆ n+1 0 -CA 0 . Let ϕ and ψ be ∆ n+1 0
3 This is equivalent, in classical logic, to what is called (¬Γ )-Sep in Simpson's book [14] . Since the term "separation" is confusing in the present context, we use "reduction" instead. 4 Strictly ID n+1 1
should be formulated in an extension of L n+1 with predicates, rather than L n+2 . If we identify the predicates with the n+2-th order objects required in the scheme (∆ n+1 0 ) − -FP, the two formulations are equivalent.
Formalizing (internalized) autonomous progression
We give some formalizations of autonomous progression, and discuss them in our new setting. First recall the standard formulation of iterated comprehension: 
and where (H) W x denotes { w , z n ∈ H | w ∈ (W ) w }.
We see briefly how the iterated comprehension simulate the ramified hierarchies relative to P(ω), P 2 (ω), V etc., in the same way as that relative to ω.
Assume Hier[Φ](H, W ), where Φ(w, y, Y, W ; x, X) is the following Σ n 2 -formula:
Here c ∈ ω is regarded, via the canonical injection, as an n+1-th order object. Assume for convenience that W is a linear order. If w is a limit in W ,
and so ((H) w ) ϕ = {z n | ϕ(z, (H) W w ; x, X)}. If w + is the successor of w,
and so ((H) w + ) ϕ = {z n | (∃u n )(∀v n )ϕ( u, v, z n n , (H) W w ; x, X)}. Iterating this process, we can see that any n+2-th order object definable by a Σ n 2i+1 -formula with parameters (H) W w , x and X can be described by ((H) w +i ) c for some c ∈ ω. Thus, if the next limit point w +ω exists, all those n+2-th order objects ∆ n+1 0 -definable with the parameters are of the form (((H) W w +ω ) x ) y . This means that the first level of the ramified hierarchy relative to the parameters (H) W w , x and X is exactly {(((H) W w +ω ) x ) y | x, y ∈ P n } (where P n is the "class" of all n+1-th order objects) and that the quantifiers ranging over the first level can be coded by n+1-th order ones. Thus the second level of the hierarchy is {(((H) W w +ω·2 ) x ) y | x, y ∈ P n }, provided the next limit w +ω·2 exists. Therefore we can conclude that iterated ∆ n+1 0 -comprehension (i.e., comprehension for n+1-order formulae) can simulate the "ramified hierarchy given the totality of the class of all the n+1-th order objects", in such a way that n+2-th order quantifiers bounded by levels of the hierarchy are coded by n+1-order -TR as the formalizations of (C) autonomous progression (because ψ may contain free variables) 6 , and of (D) internalized autonomous progression respectively. It is known that, in L 2 N , these two are proof-theoretically equivalent. However, the difficulty above does not seem to be a real difficulty in our setting (except L 2 N ), and seems to be a specialty to the traditional predicativity. It is true that WF(W ) is Π -ness of well-foundedness is only because of our choice of formulation. 7 Actually, in our setting (except L 2 N ), the well-foundedness can be expressed in a ∆ n+1 0 way as we will see in §7, and so it is legitimate in our context. Once it is legitimately accepted, there seems to be no reason that forces us to formalize autonomous progression in the roundabout sort of way by the rule, but it seems reasonable to formalize it in a simple implication ∆ n+1 0 -TR, the same as internalized autonomous progression. 5 In the terminology introduced below, this discussion shows that, over ∆ n+1 0 -CA 0 , ∆ n+1 0 -TR or -TRR is equivalent to Σ n 2 -TR or -TRR. Note that "w is limit in W " is Π n 2 . 6 Concerning (B) which requires orders to be primitive recursive, there seems to be no reason for such restriction, since any order expressed by a ∆ n+1 0 -formula (with free set variables) is predicatively legitimate. The justification for the use of a free set variable in well-foundedness (in the standard formulation of autonomous progression) seems to apply also to this relaxation. 7 As a matter of fact, the same question can be asked for traditional predicativity: even if we accept that well-foundedness is a notion along which we can iterate operations, why can we formalize it as transfinite induction for set variables? There is no guarantee that there is no better formulation of the notion. Moreover, even if we resign ourselves to taking that formulation of well-foundedness, the property "we can have the ramified hierarchy up to α" of α is not eligible to form a second order object, nor to be substituted to the set variable occurring in the formulation of well-foundedness. This problem seems to be applied even to the older principles called bar induction or bar recursion, whose origins go back to Brouwer. -formula with free variables, then, by the usual partial cut elimination method, we have a proof ending in the same formula, in which all the cut rules are immediate after the axiom or of the following form:
If ∨Γ 2 holds then ψ represents the trivial well-founded relation ∅; and if ∨Γ 2 does not, it represents W . Thus we can replace it by the following derivation:
Dependent transfinite recursion
Here we try to formalize (E) "autonomous progression of autonomous progression" (or "2-fold autonomous progression") from §1 in the simplest case, and obtain some basic results. First, our answer to the formulation problem is the following:
both for any Γ -formula ϕ( k, w , y, Y, W ; x, X) free from H and for any w ≺ k Y w defined by a Γ -formula θ(w, w , k, Y ; x, X) free from H. Analogously ∆(Γ )-TR is defined (additionally with complementedness for θ).
Here the well-founded relation ⊕ k∈ω ≺ k H k depends on the resulting H in the following manner: Since H 0 = ∅, ≺ 0 H 0 is fixed at first, not depending on H. Then, by (usual) transfinite recursion along ≺ 0 H 0 , (H) 0,x 's are (thus H 1 is) determined, and so is ≺ 1 H 1 . Then again, by usual recursion along it, H 2 is determined, and so on. This is why we call such a scheme dependent transfinite recursion. This argument shows "being unique if existing" below:
Lemma 20. In the same syntactic situation of the previous definition,
Proof. By the discussion before Lemma 20, ∆ n+1 0
as a n+2-th order object, which is what we require for ϕ ∈ Γ in Γ -TR . Why can this be seen as the simplest non-trivial instance of (internalized) "autonomous progression of autonomous progression" (from §1) of comprehension? Let us try to formalize the following situation: ≺ k+1 be definable from H k ; H k defined by transfinite recursion along ≺ k ; and all these definitions are uniform 8 in k ∈ ω. ≺ k should be defined (uniformly in k) by a formula which may contain H k (≈ H 0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ H k−1 ), and recursions along ≺ k 's must be uniform, and so expressible by single Hier[ϕ] along the sum ≺ 0 ⊕ ≺ 1 ⊕ · · · . This is the simplest among non-trivial ones, in the sense that the "preceding" order is restricted to ω. We will give a formalization of general 2-fold one in §9.
However, in L 2 N , the induction is Π 1 1 -Ind essentially and so beyond ACA 0 . The notion ProgWF itself seems impredicative and the avoidance of the difficulty by rules does not work.
Nevertheless
(which is the case except in L 2 N as shown in §7), these two formulations are equivalent for Γ = ∆ 
Proof. Following [14, Theorem V.5.1]. Let ϕ be Γ , and define ϕ + and ϕ − :
Intuitively, ϕ ± (k, w, y) assert that, for any attempt A of the hierarchy up to k, w , ϕ(k, w, y, A k,w ) or ¬ϕ(k, w, y, A k,w ), respectively, holds, where
For a fixed k, w, y, by Lemma 20 applied to ≺ j Y defined below, such A is unique if exists and so (∀k, w, y)(ϕ + (k, w, y) ∨ ϕ − (k, w, y)).
(Γ )-Red we have H such that, for any k, w, y, k, w , y ∈ H → ϕ + (k, w, y) and k, w , y / ∈ H → ϕ − (k, w, y).
( )
We shall prove by induction on k, w along
Thus the induction hypothesis is Hier[ϕ](A, (⊕
( ) Let ±(y ∈ H k,w ), i.e., ±( k, w , y ∈ H). Then, by ( ), we have ϕ ± (k, w, y) and so ±ϕ( k, w , y, A k,w , x, X), which completes the induction by ( ).
Corollary 24. Over ∆ 7 Well-foundedness and well-orderedness So far, our uniformed treatment works so well that we do not need to take care of the difference among L n+2 's in the technical discussions. In this section, we are pointing out the basis which will cause all the differences among them in the later section.
The next lemma is what makes L 2 N be exceptional, since the well-foundedness of relations whose domain is (included in) ω is Π
By Axiom (3), WF(R) is equivalent to the non-existence of R-descending ω-chain. Since an ω-chain of n+1-th order objects can be coded by an n+1-th order object, WF(R) can be free from n+2-th order quantifiers, i.e., in ∆ n+1 0 .
Proof. We prove that ¬WF(R) is equivalent to the following:
where elements of ω are regarded as n+1-th order objects via the canonical injection and where
and so X = {x | x / ∈ X} witnesses ¬WF(R). Conversely, let X witness ¬WF(R) and let X = {x | x / ∈ X }. Then we can take g ∈ X and ( * ) holds. Induction on k ∈ ω shows (∃!h n )(∃f n )ψ(h, f, k), where
Here, if n = 0, we need the replacement scheme (and the axiom of infinity) to prove that f exists as a first order object.
The need of replacement at the end explains why this lemma does not hold in L Proof. We prove the equivalence to ( †) below. Clearly WF(W ) implies ( †).
Let ¬WF(W ), say x 0 / ∈ X and X is progressive along W . Here notice that the reflection principle for ∆ 1 0 formulae can be proved in the same way as in ZF (see [10, 7. 4 Theorem]), since all the axiom schemata are (especially the replacement is) now available for all ∆ 1 0 formulae with second order parameters. Thus, we have a x 0 with (a, a∩X, a∩W ) ≺ Σ2 (V, X, W ). Then a\X witnesses ¬( †).
Remark 30. Feferman (by private communication) raised up a question on the role of the foundation scheme in the elementarity of well-foundedness: Does the lemma hold even in the absences of the foundation? Actually, the foundation scheme seems necessary to obtain the reflection principle, and, from some of the plausible notions of the universe of sets, this scheme is not necessarily valid.
The answer is: again from the viewpoint of proof-theoretic strength (or consistency strength), foundation plays no role, because we can prove the equiconsistency between NBG, minus Axiom (3) of global well-order, augmented by some of the aforementioned additional axioms with and without the foundation scheme, by the relativization of the first and second order parts to, respectively,
Obviously, the relativization interprets NBG minus Axiom (3) of global well-order and minus foundation, into itself, since elementary formulae are interpreted as elementary formulae. It also interprets the foundation scheme: for elementary ϕ, if (∀y ∈ x)ϕ WF (y) → ϕ WF (x) holds for all x ∈ WF, then, for any u ∈ WF, z = {y ∈ trcl(u ∪ {u}) | ¬ϕ WF (y)}, yielded by the separation scheme, satisfies (∀x)((∀y ∈ x)(y / ∈ z) → x / ∈ z) and so, by u ∈ WF, u / ∈ z, i.e., ϕ WF (u). Let us show, for example, that ∆ [4] invented weak induction schema along weak-well-founded relations, an analogue for recursion is hopeless.) Thus it seems impossible to argue against the privileged status of the notion of well-foundedness, even in L 2 S (and in L n+2 for n ≥ 1). Let us close this section, by pointing out that a similar phenomenon is known in higher order recursion theory: the theory of type-n functional for n ≥ 3 is quite different from that of type-2 functional, as explained, e.g., in Chapter VII "Recursion in Type-3 Functional" from Hinman [7] , where he wrote:
...this chapter is not the second in an infinite sequence. Although there are several important differences between the theories of recursion relative to functionals of types 2 and 3, most of the theory of recursion relative to functionals of types greater than 3 can be obtained from type-3 theory with essentially only notational changes. [7, p.343] The basis for this discrepancy is that the property of well-foundedness for type-2 relations is ∆
Main result
In this section, we prove the main result: "external" 2-fold autonomous progression proves the consistency of boldface "internalized" single autonomous progression ∆ n+1 0 -TR with several axiomatic schemata, if well-foundedness is ∆ n+1 0
. Thus the former system is proof-theoretically strictly stronger than the latter and that the latter does not imply ∆ 
, the full induction, foundation, separation and replacement (L 
We can see M k (H) = M k (H k), which we denote by M k , and M k 's are increasing as a sequence of LOPS models.
For a Σ 
Thus, by the absoluteness of ∆ n+1 0
If iterated comprehension (even only up to ω) for ∆ n+1 0 -formula containing M as a parameter is available, we can define the truth predicate relative to M , by which we can prove the consistency of the theory satisfied by M . Thus,
Remark 35. Since we need transfinite recursion to define the truth predicate of M after M is defined, (∆ 
Con(∆
Proof. Let T be the system. If T ∆ 
Conclusion
We have seen that the traditional predicativity, namely "predicativity given ω", is quite different from "predicativity given the totality of all real numbers", from "predicativity given the totality of all functions" and from "predicativity given the universe of sets", in the following sense: the relations among the central notions, i.e., single and multi-fold autonomous progressions of ∆ fixed point, holds to traditional predicativity but fails to the other kinds of predicativity.
Differences are summarized in Table 1 , where the base theory is ∆ More finely, which holds in which instance of L n+2 ? Indeed, this trend, restricted to L 2 S , has already mentioned in Krähenbühl [9] and Fujimoto [6] , and actually been executed in several literatures (e.g., Jäger and Krähenbühl [8] , as well as [9] and [6] ). Though one might think these results just generalizations of results known in L (II) [9] shows that NBG + Σ It seems plausible that all these results hold in general L n+2 , except L 2 N . Finally, the author would like to emphasize that this new trend of research can be seen as a continuation of his previous researches [11] and [12] on the comparison among second order frameworks, since L n+2 's can be seen as second order frameworks by considering objects of less than n+2-th order as first order objects and objects of n+2-th order as second order ones.
